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IS GOD FREE? 
REPLY TO WIERENGA 
Wes Morriston 
In a recent paper, Edward Wierenga argues that God is both morally free and 
that when there is a best option God cannot fail to choose it. Since God is not 
determined by external causes, he is free in all that he does. In this paper, 
I present a thought experiment to show that the mere absence of external 
causes is not sufficient for divine freedom. The reader is invited to imagine 
an uncaused finite being who is "good by nature." I claim that such a being 
would lack moral freedom, so that (by analogy) an uncaused God who is 
"good by nature" would lack it as well. Various attempts to find a relevant 
dissimilarity between the two cases are briefly considered. 
Many theists believe that God is a "perfect being" who cannot fail to 
choose the best. There may be circumstances in which there is not a single 
best alternative, but sometimes there is a best and when there is God's 
perfect nature guarantees that he cannot fail to choose it. A fortiori God's 
nature would not permit him to choose to do anything morally wrong. He 
is necessarily good in all that he does. It will be convenient to refer to this 
CiS the "necessary goodness doctrine," or NGD for short. 
On NGD, it seems that God is never free to choose evil, and, more gen-
erally, is never free to choose to do less than what he sees as the best. Of 
course, if God were to choose less than the best he would succeed in actual-
izing it; and some compatibilists may think that this is as much freedom as 
anyone can have. But many theists who accept NGD are libertarian incom-
patibilists. They believe that there is a more robust sense in which we hu-
mans are free. Unlike God, we can-and often do-choose to do less than 
the best. Sometimes we even choose to do what we know we ought not to 
do. We are morally accountable because we could have chosen differently, 
and it is in this power of choice that our freedom consists. We are morally 
free precisely because we have the two-way power both to choose what we 
know we ought to do and to choose what we know we ought not to do. 1 
For such theists-incompatibilists who also accept NGD-there is a se-
rious question about the nature of God's freedom. How can God be acting 
freely when he chooses the best if he is unable to choose less than the best? 
How can he have genuine moral freedom if the goodness of his nature 
prevents him from choosing what he knows to be wrong? 
In a recent paper, Edward Wierenga proposes an interesting solution 
to this problem.2 Wierenga borrows part of his solution from a traditional 
compatibilist account of freedom, but he thinks that a certain kind of in-
compatibilist can also avail himself of a key compatibilist insight. 
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According to traditional compatibilism, an action is done freely if it is 
done willingly, and it is done willingly if its antecedent causes are internal 
ones of the right sort-ones that arise "in the right manner." In the typi-
cal case, the internal causes of a person's voluntary actions are her own 
desires and beliefs, and when these arise "in the right way," she is said to 
be "acting freely." 
But what is it for them to arise "in the right way?" Most compatibilists 
want to rule out cases in which drugs or hypnosis or "nefarious neurosur-
geons manipulating their brains" are the source of the desires and beliefs 
that move a person to act. So they need to say (and do say) a lot more 
about what it is for one's desires and beliefs to arise in the right way. 
The details of these compatibilist proposals need not detain us here. 
What matters is that on any of them, NGO will be perfectly compatible 
with divine freedom. If God chooses the best because of the perfection of 
his nature, then the ultimate cause of his choice is suitably internal. 
But Wierenga does not want to defend compatibilism. He wants to pro-
vide a solution to our problem that will be attractive to incompatibilists. 
So he needs to provide an incompatibilist account of divine freedom that 
can take advantage of the compatibilist's supposed insight concerning the 
relation between freedom and internal causes. 
This might seem to be impossible. A typical incompatibilist thinks that 
an agent is not acting freely unless-exactly as things were at the time-
she could have done otherwise. For this kind of incompatibilist, determin-
ism undermines freedom because it is inconsistent with a person's ability 
to do otherwise. But then it seems that lacking that ability is all by itself 
incompatible with freedom, and this will be so even if all the causes of a 
person's action are internal to her. 
On NGO, that is exactly how it is with God. It matters not at all that 
the ultimate cause of God's choices (his perfect nature) is internal to God. 
For the fact remains that God necessarily chooses the best (when there is a 
best). Since he could not have done otherwise he is not acting freely. 
This is where things get interesting in Wierenga's discussion. He devel-
ops the incompatibilist position in a way different from the one suggested 
above. The argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism 
starts out in the familiar way. 
[1]f determinism is true, an agent's beliefs and desires themselves have 
antecedent causes stretching back to before the agent even existed. 
But, as we are about to see, Wierenga's argument makes no use of the 
claim that a free agent is able to do otherwise. The passage just quoted 
continues as follows: 
The relevant causal conditions are thus not really internal to the 
agent. The insight, to repeat, of the compatibilist is that the right 
antecedent conditions, internal to the agent, are compatible with 
the agent acting freely; on this interpretation, the compatibilist's 
mistake is in taking the proffered conditions to be in internal in 
this way.3 
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This is a bit confusing. At first glance, it looks as if Wierenga is saying 
that the desires and beliefs of the agent are "not really internal" because 
they have external causes. That would be a serious error. A desire or belief 
doesn't fail to be internal just because it lies at the end of a chain of causes, 
some of which are external. 
What Wierenga must mean, I think, is that desires and beliefs produced 
by a causal chain" stretching back to before the agent even existed" do not 
"arise in the right way." Why so? Well, perhaps Wierenga thinks that the 
sufficient cause(s) (if any) of a free act must be entirely internal to the agent. 
This-all by itself-would render freedom incompatible with determin-
i~.m, without reference to the existence of alternate possibilities. For even 
if the immediate causes of a person's action - her desires and beliefs and 
so on -are internal, determinism entails that there are external causes fur-
ther back in the causal chain. So it is in virtue of these further causes that 
the internal causes of a person's action do not "arise in the right way." 
If this is the right way to read Wierenga, then the difference between his 
view and traditional compatibilism concerns what it is for an internal cause 
to arise in the right way. Traditional compatibilism wants to rule out only a 
subset of external causes (drugs and hypnosis and malicious scientists and 
Cartesian demons). But it is not easy to define the criteria for membership 
in the class of external causes that are incompatible with freedom, and this 
is one of the principal objections to traditional compatibilism. Wierenga, 
on the other hand, has no such problem. He thinks that desires and beliefs 
do not arise in the right way if they are produced by any causes external to 
the agent. And that, of course, makes him an incompatibilist. 
On the basis of this understanding, it seems that we can construct a 
blly incompatibilist solution to the problem of reconciling God's moral 
freedom with the NGD. If God's desire for the good is determined entirely 
by his own nature, then his moral choices are wholly determined by factors 
that are internal to him. Even the incompatibilist will have no grounds for 
denying that they" arise in the right way," since, as Wierenga puts it, there 
is not a "long chain of causes stretching back to things separate from him 
that give him this constellation of knowledge, desire, and ability."4 
It should be stressed that Wierenga's defense of the compatibility of 
moral freedom and necessary goodness in God does not commit him to 
saying that they are compatible in human beings. Humans are the prod-
ucts of antecedent (and therefore external) causes. So if they were good 
by nature, there would be a chain of external causes that is (ultimately) 
responsible for their disposition to do the good; so, by Wierenga's lights, 
they would not be acting freely when that disposition produces a good 
action. God, by contrast, is the Creator (the First Cause) of everything that 
could possibly function as a cause. There can be nothing external to God 
that causes there to be a person having his perfect nature. So God -unlike 
humans-can be wholly free in an incompatibilist sense even though he is 
unable to choose less than the best. 
At first glance, this appears to be an attractive solution to our prob-
lem, but I believe the following objection has considerable weight. Even 
if, per impossibile, there were no external causes, an "essentially good" but 
Jinite person would be "stuck" with its nature, and would not therefore 
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be free with respect to those things that its nature determines it to do. To 
see this, imagine a finite person very much like a human being except for 
two things: (i) she comes into existence purely by chance and without any 
cause whatever; and (ii) her nature prevents her from ever choosing what 
she sees to be less than the best. Let's call her Bonnie Chance, or Bonnie 
for short. 
Would we regard Bonnie Chance as morally free merely on account of 
the fact that there is no external chain of causes leading up to the wonder-
ful choices she makes? The answer, surely, is that we would not. What we 
would say is that she can't help being good because she is "stuck" with a 
nature that prevents her from ever going wrong. Since it is Bonnie's na-
ture-and not Bonnie herself-that is responsible for her good behavior, we 
can only conclude that she is not acting freely when she acts for the best. 
The same, it seems to me, should be said of a God who is not able to 
choose less than the best because his moral nature determines him to 
choose the best. The mere absence of external causes is insufficient to 
guarantee his freedom, for the fact remains that he is just as determined by 
his moral nature as Bonnie is by her nature. Since God is simply "stuck" 
with his moral nature, he is not responsible either for it or for what follows 
from it, and is not therefore morally free. 
In response to this objection, some philosophers may want to claim that 
the proposed counterexample is not truly possible. For example, many 
theists hold not only that God exists in every possible world, but that ev-
erything else that exists in any possible world is-in that world-wholly 
dependent on God for its existence. If that were so, then nothing like my 
imaginary Bonnie Chance would be possible. Any person other than God 
would of necessity have been (directly or indirectly) created by God, in 
which case it would not have come into existence without a cause. 
Let's suppose that this is right, and that nothing like Bonnie Chance 
could exist. So what? "Well," the critic may reply, "legitimate counterex-
amples must be drawn from the realm of the possible-so we don't have 
to worry about the freedom of an imaginary person who comes into exis-
tence without cause." 
If the critic thinks that we never have clear intuitions about metaphysi-
cally impossible cases, he is surely mistaken. Consider the following ex-
amples. 
• If God were not essentially good, then he would be able to choose 
evil. 
• If God were to choose less than the best, he would succeed to actual-
izing it. 
• If God did not exist, then nothing would depend on him for its exis-
tence. 
• If two plus two had been five, God would have known that two plus 
two is five. 
The antecedents of all these propositions are believed by many theists to 
be metaphysically impossible. But can anyone seriously doubt that they 
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are non-trivially true?5 Or that our intuitions about what would be true 
in these metaphysically impossible circumstances-the non-existence of 
God or God's having a different nature or two plus two's being five-are 
trustworthy? If this is right, then I see no reason why the imaginary situa-
tion in my counterexample must be metaphysically possible. 
It is still true, of course, that any legitimate counterexample must be 
conceptually coherent. But there is no obvious conceptual incoherence-no 
explicit or implicit contradiction-in the supposition that Bonnie Chance 
exists. Consequently, it seems to me that our intuitions about what would 
be true of her if she did exist must be taken into account. 
So let us suppose that my intuition about Bonnie Chance is correct. 
If-per impossibile-she existed, she would not be morally free. Since her 
moral choices are determined by her nature, she is not free with respect to 
those choices. Must we not say the same of a God who is morally perfect 
by nature? 
In order to avoid this conclusion, we must find some relevant difference 
between the case of God and that of Bonnie Chance. What could it be? 
Consider first the fact that, unlike Bonnie Chance, God necessarily ex-
ists. He doesn't just happen to exist-he exists in virtue of his very na-
ture. So not only are there no external causes of his existence-there could 
be none. 
I fail to see any reason to think that this difference between God and 
Bonnie Chance is relevant. Even though God's nature is necessarily in-
stantiated, the fact remains that he is just as determined by his nature as 
Bonnie is by hers. So if God's nature-rather than God-is the ultimate de-
terminer of his moral choices, then I do not see why we should think that 
he is making them freely. 
Here is another suggestion - one that is more clearly relevant. "Theo-
logical activists" like Thomas Morris hold that God is causally responsible 
for all essences, including his own.6 If God were-literally-the cause of 
his own nature, this would seem to mark a relevant distinction between 
God and Bonnie Chance. Bonnie's choices would be determined by a na-
ture for which she is not responsible, but the same would not be true of a 
God who determines his own nature. 
Without looking too closely into the details of Morris's proposal, I think 
we can see that it won't help us here. To see why, consider the following 
question. Could God have given himself a different nature? Could God, for ex-
ample, have made himself other than perfectly good and unable to choose 
evil? Either answer will get us into trouble. If the answer is yes, then there 
must be possible worlds in which God makes himself less than perfectly 
good, in which case God is not necessarily good after all. But if (as Morris 
would surely want to say) the answer is no, then we will need to inquire 
as to why God cannot give himself some other nature. It's hard to see how 
we could appeal to his nature to explain why he couldn't have given him-
self some other nature. But we can't appeal to anything other than God's 
nature either, for this would make him depend on something external to 
himself. So it looks as if we have not escaped the conclusion that God 
is "stuck" with his nature in much the same way that Bonnie Chance is 
"stuck" with hers. 
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Yet another way out of the problem should be mentioned briefly. In 
speaking of God and Bonnie Chance as being "stuck" with their respec-
tive natures, we have implicitly assumed that God (like Bonnie) is distinct 
from his nature. This is controversial. Some theists believe that God is a 
simple being, where this entails, among other things, that God is identical 
to God's nature. If that were right, then the case of God would indeed be 
relevantly different from that of Bonnie Chance. If God is God's nature, 
then being determined by that nature is the same as being determined by 
himself, and that can hardly be inconsistent with freedom. 
Wierenga's published work does not lead one to expect him to take this 
line? So I shall refrain from saying any more about the doctrine of di-
vine simplicity here-except, of course, to note that in addition to its well 
known disadvantages the doctrine does have the advantage of offering a 
solution to our problem!S 
To conclude then: An uncaused finite person who is unable to do less 
than the best because she is good by nature would lack moral freedom. 
So-unless a relevant dissimilarity can be found-an uncaused God who 
is unable to do less than the best because he is good by nature also lacks 
moral freedom. Apart from the doctrine of divine simplicity and its claim 
that God is God's nature, it is hard to see what relevant dissimilarity there 
could be. But simplicity is a lot to take on board, and those of us who are 
(on other grounds) suspicious of the doctrine will need to deal with the 
problem in some other way. 
University oj Colorado, Boulder 
NOTES 
1. Theists who deal with the problem of evil by giving a free will defense 
are generally committed to this sort of incompatibilism. 
2. "The Freedom of God," Faith and Philosophy Vol. 19, No.4 (2002), pp. 
425-36). 
3. Wierenga, p. 434. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Accounting for the non-trivial truth of per impossibile conditionals is 
well-known problem in the semantics of counterfactuals, and one to which 
there is no generally accepted solution. Here I am merely helping myself to 
the comparatively uncontroversial claim that there are such truths. 
6. Thomas V. Morris, "Absolute Creation," in Thomas Morris, Anselmian 
Explorations (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1987): pp. 161-78. 
7. For example, in The Nature oJGod (Cornell Univ Press: Ithaca, 1989), Wi-
erenga says only this about simplicity: "We shall not investigate the doctrine 
of divine Simplicity; I have nothing constructive to say about it." (p. 173). 
8. For a sympathetic discussion, see Eleonore Stump and Norman 
Kretzmann, "Absolute Simplicity," Faith and Philosophy Vol. 2, No.4 (1985), pp. 
353-82. 
